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Maureen .1\. Call~nan
Jcnmier L ]tp:son
Unuer<at:y ofCaL[CTmJa. Santa Cru::

Child:
Father;
Child:
Father:

["s•· three 1wm, I I momltsj \\llrere 1s my brain?
Hcu. {Pomti11g to her laead.J
h11y 1> rhere 11 bone m my head?

Buaus,· )'OIIr brain is an unport<Jnr orgm1 and your .<kull
prorccts 1r.
Child: Wlty is 11 important?
Father; Became ir helps )'Or/ rhink and become mtelligcm.
Child: lj my bmm gets lum lwon'r be mrl'lilgem?
Father: No, 1[your bmm gets lturr you won'r be u11elligenr like
you are now.

When ~esignmg programs for science learning, it is important to consider
th~t chtl.dren's experiences with science begin years before they encounter
sete_nce tn th~ cl,1Ssroom. Ch ildren's developing understanding of science
bcgms tn thcar everyday activities and conversations about the natural and
tcchntcal world Children develop "scientific literacy" as they began to
learn the . l~nguagc of science (e.g., concepts such as "gravity" or "meta
morp_h om ), the kands of causal explanations that are used in scientific
theones (e.g.• the day -mght cycle results from the rotatiOn of the earth),
and the kmds of procedures that are used to answer scientific questions
(e.g.: tes~mg .hypotheses, controUing variables). Laboratory studies of chi!
dren s sc~entttic understanding have uncovered crucial information about
the. cognutvc processes mvolved in learning scientific topics (Carey. 1985;
Cht, Sloua, & de l.eeuw, 1994; Rosengren, Gelman, Kalish, & McCormtck,
21
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199 1· Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992) and scientific reasoning strategies
( Sch~uble, 1990; Klahr. Fay, & Dunb.n, 1993). These studie~ provide the
kind of controlled manipulation of variables that allow prec1se mferences
about how children reason on certain tasks. \'\fhatthesc laboratory stud1es
cannot provide, however. is an understanding of the natural c~nte.xts
within which scientific literacy emerges. Because aspects of sc1cnufic
thinking seem to vary depending on experience and cultural backg~ound
(Ku hn , 1996; Samarapungavan, Vosniadou. ~ Brewer, 1996_}. t.herc IS rea
~on to believe that socialization may play an Important role 1n 1ts develop
men t. In this chapter. we consider everyday conversations with .family
members as a context in which young children begin to develop setenllftc
literacy well before they enter school.
"
In particular. we focus on a discourse style that. we c~ll explanato ry
conversation:· As illustrated in the example that begms th1s chapter, these
conversdtions include "whyft questions and/or causal explanations. Many
researchers have noh:d the sense of wonder in young children's "why"
questions about aspects of themselves and of the world aroun~ the~l (see
Chukovsky, 1963; P iaget, 1974). As Simon suggests cls_ew.here Ill _th1s vol 
ume. children's questions represent just the kind of cunos1ty that IS funda 
mental to initiating the process of scientific discovery. Parents also ~ffer
causal explanations to their children f~r ho~" things. work and why t~lllgs
happen. sometimes 111 answer to children s questions and other tunes
spontaneously (Callana n & Oakes, 1992; Crowley & Callanan, 19.98; Cal
lanan, Shrager, & Moore, 1995). These questions and cxpla~allo~s a~e
components of the "explanatory conversations" that we cons1dcr. 111 th1s
chapter as social contexts within which children may be fornmlat u1g and
revising their understanding of scientific concepts.
.
.
Investigations of children's conversations ~bout ~c1ence d1ffer from
experimental work in importJnt wJys and pr~v1de a d1fferent ~ort of data
that is equally crucial to a precise understandmg of h?man s~u:n~1fic rea 
soning. If we understand how you.ng ~h ildr~n expenenc: sclcntlfic.con
ccpts and explanations as they anse 111 the1r everyd.ay hves, w.e . w11l be
better able to assess the relative importance of tndlv!dual cogmttve pro
cesses and social experiences in children's developing understa~1d!ng of
science. In this chapter we will discuss research explonng n~o mam ISsue~:
( 1) how children's curiosity leads the m to ask causal q ueStiOns.about s.cl·
cntific phenomena; and (2) how parents. in everyday conversations •. gu~de
children in interpreting scientific information and model w,tys of thmkmg
about scientific processes. Along the way we will addres.s questions ~bout
cultural differences in the ways that children learn to thmk about sc1encc,

1nd

d iscuss ways to assess the impact of explanatory conversations for
developing understanding of science. Finally, we will consider
.orne theoretical ideas abou t how to integrate this type of research with
e more traditional ways of studying scientific reasoning and ideas.
The study of explanatory conversations ts motivated by several cur
ren t approaches to the study of cogn itive development. in particular. the
"theory theoryft approach, with its focus on the individual child, and the
sociocultural approach, with its focus o n th e child in social context. The
"theory theory" approach, presented by Gopnik and Meltzoff ( 1997) and
Wellman and Gelman (1998 ) among others. focuses on how ch1ldren's
naive theo ries of impor ta nt do mai ns change across development. Gopnik
( 1998) argues that seeking causes and explanations is a basic and universal
component of human cognition. Recent sociocultural views, in contrast,
have emphasized the social context of cognitive development (Rogoff,
1990; Rogoff, 1998; Tharp & Gallimore, 1988) and called for a shift from
the focus on w!IM chi ldren know to a focus on llow children come to know
within o~ctivity settings of their everyday lives. We will argue that the social
context of explanatory conversations may be an important arena for chil
dren's thinking about science. Within these conversations children and
their conversational partners are creating the very settings in which chil
dren lear n about the issues that a re puzzling and interesti ng to them. We
suggest that as a result of these conversations. children may develop and
revise the1r ''theories" about scientific (and social) domains. Pa rents' par
ticipat ion in these causal conversations may provide children with infor
mation not only about science content. but also about whether asking
these sorts of questions is valued in the comm uni ty. and abou t how to
begin to find answers. Rogoff, Mistry, Goncu, and Mosier ( 1993) suggest
that explanatory conversation is a d1scoursc style that is not necessarily
shared across cu ltural groups. In their study, fo r example. Salt Lake City
mothers were about twice as likely to explain the workings of a toy to their
toddlers as were Mayan Guatema lan mothers. It is clearly essent ial to
explore what explanatory conversations look like across different families,
communities, and cultures.
The study of causal conversa tions in everyday situations, then. is a
window on children's thinking as well as on social contexts of learning.
One challenge in this research, however, is that it is difficult to capture the
moments of inquiry and discovery just as they are happening. Evidence
suggests that explanatory conversations are likely to happen in the midst
of eve ryday fam ily activ ities, such as drivi ng in the car or trying to cook a
family dinner (Callanan & Oakes, 1992; Eisenberg, 1991 ), making it diffi 
11dren's
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cu lt for us as researchers to be in the right place at the right time. This also
may mean that explam1tory conversations are likely to occur outside of the
settings where much of the research on parental input has taken place,
largely experimenter-initiated tasks, free play, and book reading. r:or
example, Gelman, Coley, Rosengren. Hartman, and Pappas (1998) found
few explicit discussions about the underlying essence of category mem
bership in their investigation of parents reading picture books with chil
dren . Gelman et al. found, instead, that parents used more subtle cues,
such as gestures (e.g., linking two pictures with a sweep of the hand) and
brief generic stJtements (e.g .. ''birds lay eggs") to guide children's under
standing of shared category membership. It may be a mistake to conclude
from this, however, that children's theory revision happens independently
of explicit explanations from par.:nts. Picture book reading is an activity
with a particular structure and a typical discourse pattern that may not
involve explanations. In the midst of other types of activities, however,
children and po~rents may be likely to engage in explanatory conversations.
In this chapter. we will describe three types of studies using different
methods to capture (for subsequent coding) the moments when natural
explanatory convcrsataons occur. First, we discuss studies using a diary
mc:thod; second, we discuss a method of observing natural conversations
in a museum setting; and third, we discus.~ a method in which we give par
ents and children a more focused task that is designed to elicit explana
tions about a particular domain. For each s tudy we will describe the
method and some of our findings regard in); children's and pa rents' contri
butions to these causal conversations. Different methods emphasize dif
ferent types of contributions. For e)(;)mple, the diary methodology we
have used focuses on children's "why" questions as initiators of causal
conversations. In contrast, when we explore parent-child conversations in
a museum setting. th e explanatory conversations we see seldom begin
with a "why" question from a ch ild. This underscores the importance of
using multiple methods in order to obtain a more complete representa
tion of the types of explanatory conversations in which pa rents and chil
dren arc engaged. After discussing the three studies, we will consider a
difficult open question regarding whether and how these conversations
may have impact on children's cognitive development. We will explore
both methodological and theoretical aspects of this question.
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Children's "Why" Questions: A Diary Methodology
One method w_e have usc~ to ca.pture the moments when natural explana
tory conversataons occur as a daary technique, where we asked parents to
keep track of their children's "why" questions and the conversations that
foJJ.owcd. With this technique researchers are not present during the inte~
acllon to document all of the detail of the discussion, and we are limited
by wh~t par~nts ren~ernber or choose to report. But we do have the advan 
tage wath ~has techmq~e of gathering data about the phenomena that puz
zle and . mterest children enough for them to spontaneously seek
explan~uon~ from the adults around them. Because children are creaung
these ~lluataons for themselves ( rather than having them initi.lled b
resea:chers, or even parents), they seem particularly revealing of children~
own mterests and motivations, and they may be particularly likely settings
for conceptual change to occur.
The dia~y n~ethodology also allows us to address two important
mcthodologacal assues that arise in research with families from diverse
backgrounds (for example, immigrant parents, parents with lower eco
~~mac ~talus, and parents with lower formal educational bdckgrounds).
Farst, t~.:se parents m.ay have a very different perception of the experimen
tal scttmg than do maddle-class, highly-educated white parents. We argue
that looking at. children's spontaneous "why" questions may be a method
less prone to baas than other cypes ofstudies. Bringing a child and parent
loa ).Jboratory situation may be more uncomfortable for parents who arc
u nacc~sto~wd l<: university environments than asking them to keep track
of thear chaldren s questions at home. Second , the diary reports can be
collt>cted through telephone interviews, eliminating potential difficulties
related to parents' literacy.
T.he d~~ry ~~.chniql!e, by definition, focuses us on child ren's "why"
quest~ons. Why qucstaons have been studied in grea t detail as a window
on cl.uldrcn's ~hink ing. Piaget (!974) a rgued that "There is no better intro
ductaon t~ ch ald logic than the study of spontaneous questions" (p. 171 }.
In these daary studies, our foc:us goes beyond what children's questions tell
us .ab~ut what they arc thinking, and also includes the conversational
actavatiCS that emerge in response to these questions. Rather than focusing
on. what we can learn from children's questions, then, we focus on what
chaldren . themselves might karn from having asked the question and
en gaged 111 the wnvers.ation that follows.
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In previo us work with mostly middle-i ncome Euro pean-American
families, we have found tha t preschool children ask "why" ques tio ns about
complex scie ntific phe nomena, and that pa rents'a nswers potentially offer
guidance fo r child ren'~ theo ry development (Callanan & Oakes, 1992).
(Children, of course, ask questi ons about non-scientific domai ns as well,
but for the purposes of this chap ter we consider only the questions about
scientific do mai ns.) Decause some research suggests that scienti ftc causal
explana tion nwy be more cha racteristic of middle-class western commu
nities (e.g.. Rogoff et al., 1993), it is important to explore conversations in
families of thfferent cultural backgrounds. Previous resea rch has sug
gested that questions and causal conversations may not be as common for
L.Hino children a~ for children from European-American backgrounds
(I Ieath, 1986). Delgado-Gaitan (1994), for example, argues that Mexican
immigrant children may be taught that questioning adults is a sign of dis
respect. (llowever, Delgado-Gaitan al~o reports that in the Mexican
descent famihes she studied, there was a sharp division between school
related topics and other topics, with Mexican immigrant parents being
very open to children's questions when they saw them as part of their
schooling.} Other studies suggest that Latino parents with more formal
schooling arc more likely to usc an "inquiry" style with their children
(e.g., L1o;a, 1980). This literature raises questions about whether the
kinds of "why" questions documented in middle-class European-Ameri
can families Jre likely to occu r in Mexican-descent families, and whether
they vary in frequency depending on pa ren ts' fo rmal schooling. In an
attempt to address these issues, we have been wo rking with Mexican
descen t families as well as f:uropca n-descen t families, and we have also
looked at parents' ed uca tional background as a po ten tially impo rta nt
moderator variahit>.
In our diary study (Ca llanan. Pcrcz-G ranados, Barajas, & Goldbe rg,
1999}. forty-eigh t Mexica n-descent fa milies kept track of thei r children's
"why" questio ns f()r two weeks. There were two gro ups, varying in yea rs of
mother~· fo rmal schooli ng. The "higher education" parents had com
pleted high school or completed at least some college (mean years of
schooling=l4). The "lower education" parents had not completed high
school (mean years of schooling=seven). Willingness to pa rticipate in the
study was high within both groups of pMents. Parents from the "lower
educJtion" group were easier to identify becJuse many of them lived in
the same neighborhoods or attended Head Start programs. Families were
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li'o contacted through commu nity groups, social service orga nizations,
or word-of-mouth. Parents from the "higher educati on" group were con
t. dcd through a bilingual preschool, advertisements in a bili ngual ncws
flapcr, and thro ugh word-o f-mouth. Within each education group there
were two age gro ups ofchildren-a youn ger group (mean age=3: 10, r.111ge
4 to 4:5) and an older group (mean age=5:2, ra nge 4:7 to 5: 11 ). For ~im
•l"city, we will refer to these two groups as three-ycar-olds and five-year
as.
Consid.·ring our earlier data from Anglo families (Callanan & Oakes,
92), as well as our d.Ha from higher and lower education Mexican
esccnt families (C.1IIanan <!l al., 1999). we see a great deal ofevidence that
reschoolcrs' causal conver~tions exhibit curiosity and intere~t in making
nnc,tions among things they experience in everyday life. Parents
orted questions asked by their children on a wide range of topics, as
own by the examples in "Iable 1. 1
1 Ne I Eumple' of O.:uy Qucsuons
1EXJCAN·O~St t~'IT l'.o\MIIti:S: LowER FORM.~l EDUCATION

from CJ11anan et al., 1999)
;Como ~f •l'•dos prsrados mulan ~" d agua y no St' alrogan> ( 4;8)
llo1v wmc fish are in th<' water and they don't drown?
;l'ofiJIIt <n11amus? (5:8 )
Why dcJ 1>'1! drcdm?

;Por qm' cl nitio 110 tirm• dimtt·s> (4:I)
Why do,•sn't

the baby haw any teeth?

;Por qru' l11s mtbc·s i'Siflll pi..ttulas de negrn? (J:8)
Why Me th~ clouds painted

black?

;PM qrn' jlot1111 los nviOIII.'S y 110 se cam? (5;3)

Why c.lo airplanes float and not fall?

;Por IJIIC 1/ucvd (3: I I )
Why docs it rain?

t. All qu<>tlon' •>M-d '" Sp.~n"h >« lr>nsbr<d •nd pr<Snlr<d tn both bnjlWg<s Qu<>uons •sk<d
Engh>h .r< pr<><nt<d In Engh"' only

>n
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MEXJCAN-OESCENT FAMILIES; HIGHER FORMAL EDUCATION

(from Callanan et al., 1999)
;Por qwila luna no mds se mira wando estlf oscuro? (4;1)
Why C<tn you on ly see the moon when it's dark?
;Por que sale el sol? (3;4)
Why does the sun come out?
;Por que se nos pudre11 los die11tes si comemos drrlces? (5;8)
Why do our teeth rot if we eat candy'
;Por que Ia Irma camina co11 nosotros? ( 4; 11)
Why does the moon walk with us?
;Por q111! 1/ueve> (3;7}
Why does it rain?
Wiry do people get cancer? (5;4)
ANGLO FAMILIES

(from Callanan & Oakes, 1992)
Where does rain come from? ( 3;5)
How those jets get up tlrere? (3:0)
How does the fire go out i11 tire candle? 4:2)
How do the firemen not get brmrcd1 ( 4; I)
How come the moon is big and ormrge now but other times it's little and
white? ( 4;2)

Causal questions were not necessarily frequent events in all fam ilies
(the average number of questions reported was approximately ten in a
two-week period). but almost all of the children asked at least one of these
questions. For this chapter, we consider a subset of children's questions
that were identified as "science" questions, that is, potentially related to
natural phenomena, biological processes, or physical mechanisms (as
compa red with "social" questions, which were related to human behavior,
mental states, and cultural or religious traditions). 2

l . Tht distinction between "science"' and "social" topics is. admittedly, an arbitrary ont. Children do

not necessarily think of these as distinct domains, as suggested by Corey's ( 1985) work, for exampte.
Vie wouJd arg\lt:, howtvtr, lh;u tht distincuon ts a meaningful one for the parents who are answtr·

ing the questions. The: que$tions about the natural and physical world also tou'h on topics !hat are
more relevant to the focus o( this volume. F\J_rthcr, wht"n all o( tht questions arc includtd tn tht
.~nalyses, the pattc.-rns of results arc Vlrtu;tUy identical($« Callanan,et a!.. 1999).
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Children_'s question~ provide evidence of scientific thinking in several
way~. They 1~volve askmg for causes of events, noticiltg patterns, and
seeking ?efi~1t10n~ for ne~., words: Sometimes children evidenced hypoth 
esls-testmg m therr questtons, as m the following example from Calla nan
and Oakes ( 1992):
Ch ild:

Why does Daddy. /ames (big brother), awl me have blue
eyes and you lwve green eyes?
Mother: You got your eyes from Daddy. (Said goodnig/11, and left
tire room. )
Chi ld: (Calling mother back into the room.) [like Pee-Wee Her
man and I have blue eyt•s. Daddy likes Pee-Wee Herman
tllld he ltas blue eyes. fames likes Pee-Wee Herman a11d lte
lras blue eyes. lfyou liked Pee- Wee Hernuw you could get
blue eyes too.
Mol her: It would take more titan liking Pee Wee Herman to make
my eyes blue. God gave me this color and it can't be
changed.
Child: Could you try to like Pee Wee Herman so we could see if
your eyes fllrn blue?

This ex_ample is striking because, despite this four-year-old's na ive
understandmg_of the potential ca uses of eye color, she shows a strong
gras~ of sctcnllfic method and variable manipulation. Young children are
not hkely to carve up the world along the lines drawn by scien tific disci
plmes. The questions reported in Jhese diary studies do show, however,
that preschool child~en. show great interest in many phenomena that
a_dults. would categonze m the fields of biology, physics. and other scien
tJfic disciplines.
Interesti ngly, there is very little eviden ce of difference in the questions
asked by ch~d~en from different ethnic or educational backgrounds.
D~splte pred ictiOns drawn from the literature then, the Mexican-descent
.children tn our studies asked virtually the same types of questions as the
Anglo children, regardless of the educational background of their parents
(Callanan et al., 1999).
.
Because ou r focus is on co-construction of scientific lite racy, we are
mterested not only in the questions children ask but also in the parents'
responses and the ensuing conversations. How might parents guide chil
~ren's understanding and interest in science? While explanatory conversa
ttons may be relatively rare events, we have found that when children ask
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causal questions, parents arc very likely to explain causal connections to
them. Parents' responses were coded into four categories:
1. Causal, including c.1 usal mechanism, e.g., ''He got hurt because

he was hit by a car," as well as causal outwme, e.g., "You have a
mouth so you c:m cat."
2. Religious, e.g., "God made it that way."
3. Unexplained e)sence, e.g., "That's how ducks are made."
4. Non-causal, e.g.• in answer to "How arc babies born?" tht:

response w;~s "The baby is in my stomach."
P.1rents of Anglo and Mexicdn descent, and parents from higher and
lower cduc.1tional backgrounds, were all likely to provide causal answers
to their children's questions. ror example, in the Callanan et al. ( 1999)
study with MexiCan-descent fam1lies, an average of 56% of parents'
responses to chaldren's questions were causal. The average percentage of
the other response types were: religaous responses, 2o/o; unexplained
essences, 17o/o; non -causal responses, 25%. The pattern of responses was
the same for the two groups of families, and similar to those found by Cal
lanan and Oakes ( 1992) for Anglo families.
Although children asked questions about a wide variety of topics, we
focus here on the conversations that emerged in our study of Mexican
descent chaldren from questions about two particular sub-domains of
biology: ( 1) hum,an birth and (2) human anatomy. These two sets ofques
tions contr.1st with one another in interesting ways. The birth questions
represent cases where children arc asking for a causal explanation for an
event that is uncl ea r to them (i.e., "Where do babies come from?"),
whereas the anatomy questions seem somewhat more vague and open
ended (e.g.• ''Why do I have a mouth?"). At firsa glance, then, the birth
questions may seem like better opportunities for parents to "teach" chil
dren something about biology. But, exploring these two sets of conve rsa
tions revealed some unexpected patterns.
Birth Qut:stions
Questions about how babies are born occurred in both education groups,
but it is interesting that in the lower-education group they were asked
roughly equally at both ages (33% of three-year-olds and 50% of five
year-olds), while in the higher-education group, they were somewhat
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more common in fivc-ycar-olds (SO% of the children) than in three-year
olds (So/o of the children ). The paren ts' answers to questions about where
bJhies come from varied in both groups. There were parents from both
educational backgrounds who reported that they didn't know how to
nswer, or that they told children to "wait till they were older." There were
Jl'o parents in both groups who gave children accu rate information-as
~own in the examples below, these answers usually did not provide very
e~ ·nsive information about conception or the birth proce)S, but they
provided some limited information about causal connections.
Nino:
Madre:
Chald:
Mother:

; De dorrdc vrene11 los babies?
/)c/cstomago.

Where do b~bies come from?
From your stomach.

;Por que' tomo tiempo trerrerr que esttlr nlu [err d vrerr
tr.:J?
Madre: Pu,·s dura rwevt" meses pnra que cram el bcbt'.
Child: Why do babies have to be there so long?
~loa her: Well i1 takes nine months for ahe baby to grow.
\fiila:

; l>or que cr1ando wra personn rstti err In pnrrw de In
otra rl bcbc se hnce uno bolita?
Madre: Porquc los bcbcs SOli clriquitos y Ia pn11Ztl de In mama
es min mils clriqurtn, y por cso se lrncc wra bolitn.
Nn1J:

Child: Why is i1 thai when a person is in another person's
stom:tch I hey become a little ball?
Mother: Because babies are lillie but aheir mom's stonuch is
even smaller and that is why a little ball forms.
These co nversations about where babies come from may suggest that
parents don't provide much guidance in children's theory building at this
young age. 1-lowcver, parents' answers to this particular type of question
may not b~ representative of their answers to other topics. Most parents
rt.port~d that these ~ere particularly difficult conversations, and that they
were Cather uncomfortable about these questions or just confused about
how much detail to provide.
naromy Questions
Parents' answers to children's questions about human anatomy provide an
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interesting contrast. These included questions about why people have c~r
tain body parts. (e.g., "Why do we have a mouth?") as well as question,
about features of p:.rticu lar body parts (e.g., "Why do yo u have black hair
and I have yellow h air?", "Why does her foot hurt?"). Anatomy qucstiom
were asked by 54o/o of the children with higher-education mothers. and
SOo/o of the children with lower-education mothers (collapsed across agel.
The proportion of causal explanations gtven to these questions was not
significantly different across maternal education levels, though there w... ~ .~
trend for more caus:.l responses in higher-education families (M=57°o)
than in lower-education families (M=30o/o).
Despite the fact that the anatomy questions seem quite open-ended, it
is s triking that in answering these questions, p:.rents often directed chi!
dren toward biological content. As some of the following examples show,
many of these questions seemed to arise from events that children were
questioning in a more "social" way, but parents' dnswers seem to ha\c
been focusing them toward the biological domain. for example by mtro
ducing words like "grow" or by describing developmental processes.
Ninn:
Madre:

;Por que a/ be/1e rro lc lrarr >ttlulo los dreures y al otro rririo sr?
l'<lrfl'll' 11111odns las pcrsorras scm rgunlcs y porqur 11 algww

lt•s salm prim<'T"V 'i"c 11 orrvs.
Why doesn't this baby h.we teeth and the other child
does?
Mother: Be(au~e not everybody is the >31110: and some people grow
them sooner than others.
J?t"IIIC

Child:

Nino: ;Por 'l"r 11 mi lrermamro no le lmmrros los dicmcs!
Madre: HrJO. cirririo todavia 110 trcrre drcmes pnra lrtvarlos, cswmuy
clwJitito.
Child: Why don't 1ve brush my brother'; teeth'
Mother: Honey, the bab)' still doesn't hJvc any teeth to wash, he's
too little.

'I'"'

Nit1o: ;Por
leiria pelo corro en esra fo ro!
Madre: Porque eras mas pequetia, <r<u mw btbrra.
Child: Why did I have short hair in this picture?
Mother: Because ynu were younger then, you were a baby.
Nino:
Madre:
Chi ld:
Mother:

; Pur tjllt! rerrian los brbiros cl pelo corro?
Crmndo los 11irios 11ace" ricrrcrr p11ro prlo o rrace11 sin pclo.

Why do babies have short hair?
When children are born, they are horn with little or no
hdir.

Child:
Mother:

33

How can I get boo-boos? [Breasts. jl low come you have
some and I don't?
You're still growing. As you eat better and get bigger, they
will start growing.

nile these questions focus on how things appcJr at the present time,
teresting to see how often parents' answers draw children's attention
ocesses of growth, change, and birth. Using phrJses such as "when
ere a baby" or "you're still growing" may begin to help children
d 1 ~ate the domain of human growth and change. Because questions
about body parts so often led to these sorts of discussions. children may
J... n from such conversations that body parts and appectra nce are con
ted to processes of growth and change. Although p.trents in this study
not report many complex scientific explanations. these .matomy con·
tions suggest that parents may guide children's theory development
elping them to pick out the relevant domain of explanation and by
t' viding them with fragments of the puzzle of how to interpret different
d~ily experiences in larger explanatory frameworks.
In sum, the diary studies provide us with some ev idence that chil
dren's " why" questions invite parents to e nter into explana tory conve rsa
ttons with them. These quest ions cover a wide range of top ics that would
t 11 into scientific disciplines. Parents and children from the different
i' ckgrounds studied so far seem to engage in very similar types of conver·
~..;tions. In addition to providing mformation about science, parents may
.. so be guiding children's understanding of scientific domains by commu
nacating to them evaluations about what kinds of things are important to
know. In Goodnow's { 1990) provocative discussion about the socializa
tion of cognition, she suggests that researchers need to allend more to the
subtle messages available to ch ildren regarding what are the appropriate
and inappropriate things for them to know about. In responding to chil
dren's questions about birth, parents seemed to give the indirect message
that children should not know much about this topic. \\Then answering
anatomy questions, however, parents seemed quite intent on having their
children understand something about the process of human growth and
development. There are likely to be differences across families and cul
tures regarding the kinds of knowledge that are valued. Interestingly, how
ever, in the work we have do11c with European - and Mexican-descent
families from different educational backgrounds, we hav.: not seen differ
ences in the value placed on the process of discovery. In informal inter
views with parents as part of the diary studies. parents were virtually
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un ifo rmly positive in their opinions about the value of children's ques
tio ns and in tlwir will i ngnes~ to provide answers.
Parents' Explanati ons: Convc r>ations in a Museum
The second technique we have used to "capture" explanatory conversa
tion~ i; to observe fami l ie~ in a setting that provides motivation for par
ent~ and children to talk about scientific events and thei r explanations. In
collaboration with Kevin Crowley. we have observed and videotaped par
.:nt-child convers.1t10ns in a hands-on children's museum, the San Jose
Children's Discovery Museum. Th1s collaborat1ve work is described more
fully in Crowley's chapter ebewhere in this volume. Our goals in videotap
ing conversatiom that occur while fam1lie~ interact with exhibits are to see
how often explanatiom occur a~ well ,,s to gain a better understanding of
the dyn.units of these (On\W\ations. While we don't expect every interac
tion in this setting to lx· focused on \Cientific explanations, the design of
the environment may gi\'C us a better chance of capturing explanatory
conver~.:ttions here than in other settings. In our discussion we will refe r
to two d.ll.t ~e4: one sample of 269 part•nt -child interactions across a vari
ety ofdifferent museum exhibit~ ••tnd ,, ~epa rate sample of 50 interactions
at one parltcular exhibit, the "Take Another Look at Change" exhibit.
In the l.trger dat,J ~t. the proportion of inte ractions in which parents
gave an explanation wJs :!5.6 o/o over«ll. Three different types of explana
tions wert' ider11ificd: scientific principles, causal connections, and con
nections to prior experience. In the museum setting, unli ke in the diary
reports, w..: fou nd that paren t~' cxplamll ions most often emerged in the
absence of"why" <J UCst i on~ from chi ldre n. Consistent wi th the d iary fi nd
ings, though, parents' explan.llions seldom gave full accounts of scientific
principles. Parents explained abstr.tcl scientific principles, for example
introductng concepts like gravity, in only 12% of the explanations they
gave. Instead, most explanations were identified as causal connections,
which involved gtvmg specifk information about causes of a particular
event ( 54% of the explanattons given). The following example was
recorded at a lOClropc exhibit: "Each one of those pictures is a little differ
ent pose on the horse, and it m.tkes it look like it is galloping." As in the
diary data, then, there ;ecms to be,, focus on helping the child to under
stand the particular event a~ it is happening rather than a focus on more
abstr.tct reasoning.
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In the third explanation type. connections to prior experience, par
ents connected the present expe rience to the child's previous ex periences.
This happened in 25% of the explanations in the larger museum sample.
An example recorded at a hea rtbeat ex.hibi t was: " Remember the stetho
scope at the doctor's~ We ca n liste n to your hea rt beat." This strategy of
connecting an explanation to a child's previous experiences was also
apparent in many of the parents' responses in the diary study. This strat
egy may be a particularly effective way to engage children in science top
ics. In Tharp's ( 1997) discussion of five standards for culturally relevant
pedagogy, he proposes contcxtunlizarion as one of the standards, and
argues that contextualizing new information in children's experience is a
necessary component of effective teaching. Consistent with the work of
Moll and Gonzalel ( 1994), Tharp also argues that contextualization may
be particularly important when teaching children from culturally diverse
backgrounds for whom middle-class schooling practices may be unfamil
iar. Our data suggest that parents naturally usc this effective strategy of
contextualiztng new information in children's prior experiences.
Beyond the explanations th,ll have been discussed, another more sub
tle way that parents may guide children's developing scientific literacy is
by helping children ident1fy the domains of thought that are relevant to
the events or activities in which they are engaged. Experience does not
come parsed 11110 domJins. Within the context oi the Children's Discovery
Museum, parents have opportunities to help children interpret their expc
rien,es by guiding their attention to relevan t featu res of novel and com
plex ~ituation~. In one exhibit (Figure I), children and parent~ observe
time-lapse photography of objects changing (e.g., plants growi ng, me tal
rusti ng, candles melt ing). As wi th most museum exhibits, and everyday
life in general, the Take Another Look at Change exhibit affo rds multiple
pos~ i hlc top ics for engagement <tnd co nversatio n. In pa rticular. parents
can focus on the co ntent of what is changing in the videos, or they can
focus on the technology behind the production of the time-lapse video~.
Wh.tt parents choose to talk about is likely to influence children's focus of
attention and their interpretation of what they are seeing. In other words.
p.m:nts may be guiding children in terms of how to Mparse" their expen
encc .It the ex.hibit.
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1 The "Take Another Look at Change• Exh1bi1. a) This exhibit offers multiple pos·

si:i~es ·for cwloration and eonvcrsmion. b) The v1deo coment compone~l of the exh1blt

consists of >evcral videotaped events depicting common obJeCtS u~dergomg changes-of·
state (e.g .. plantS growing. mct~l rusting. banan:L\ rouing). c) The vtdeo technology co~·
poncnt coMist~ of the u~ of time-lapse photography to capture these change-of-state
eventS, allow 1ng museum visitors to obser.-c often lengthy processes in just a few seconds.

Our ana lysis of 50 interactions at this exhibit supports_ the_idea that
parents play a role in parsing and interpreting events for thetr cluldren. Of
the parents we observed, 56o/o chose to focus exclu~ively on _the conten.t of
the videos, discussing what was happening to parttcular objec.ts over ume
(e.g., "The plant is dying; that's what happens when we don I water our
plants.») and treating the time-lapse photography as transparent. Another
32o/o of the parents discussed both the change-of-state events ~nd .'h.e
technological process by which these events were captured (e.g._. Th ts ts
time-lapse photography, where they put a camera on somethmg for a
really long time and then they sped it up really ~ast.").' and 12% of the par
ents did not engage in co nversation while at t~ ts exl~ tbtt. None o_f the par
ents chose to focus on the time-lapse mechantsm wllhout ment10n of the

change-of-state events. It is, perhaps, not surprising that parents found
the content of the videos more salient than the medium rhat was used to
present tha t content. The fact that some parents focused children on the
time-lapse technology does illustrate, however, that events can be inter
preted in multiple ways. Parents talk to children in ways that may help
children to understand the abstract domains that arc relevant to the activ
ities in which they arc engaged.
When we investigated the ways that parents talked about the change
of-state events. we again found considerable variability in the talk. Twenty
percent of the parents merely labeled the objects that were changing. More
commonly, parents used descriptive or explanatory language in addition
to labels for the objects. Thirty-six percent of the parents used change-of
state verbs. such as "grow" or "rust," to describe the events. This level of
information not only provides childre n with an approp riate verb for
observed changes, but may also help children to distinguish among events
that are perceptually similar but result from different causes (e.g., a melt
ing candle vs. a withering plant). Thirty-two percent gave even more
explicit information about causal mechanisms for the changes that were
occurring in the videotapes. For example, one parent said, "The beans
died because they didn't get enough water." These parents provided the
most detailed diffe rentiation of causes for different events. This ca usal
information could be very informative to children as they are learning
about physical vs. biological changes.
Most museum exhibits, like most events in everyday life, do not fall
neatly into one particular scientific domain. Parents' explanations often
specify the relevant domain and help children to focus on what is impor
tant within the domain. We are still at the beginning of the process of try
ing to understand how chjldren may be learning from parents'
explanations. Some conversations suggest that children may be learning
new ideas from their parents. as in the example below:
Parent: They stopped wareri11g 11. Sec what lwppencd ne.~r, b.:ca11sc
Child:
Parent:
Child:

there is uo water.
They all dil'tf?
Because they're not gor111a get any water.
Poor things!

Whether this child is really learning something new cannot be determined
with certainty in such cases, however, and experimental studies are
needed to address these questions more directly. Other conversations sug
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gest that certain explanations may not increase children's understanding
of the phenomenon, as in the example below:
Parent: Sec tlwt litrl~ dock i11 tlwre? 'l7rcy're fast fonwlrdi,g tire
Child:

growt/1 of tl•~ potlltOrs.
So they m11 make tl1cm grow faster?

This child's confusion was not cleared up in the conversation that fol
lowed. At times, parents may provide misleading or incorrect information
to children.
This close inspection of parent-child interactions at a single exhibit
not only demonstrates what parents do to structure the learning process.
but also reveals ways that parents and children together co-construct
understandings (or misunderstandings) within their interactions.
Parent-Child Discussions of Growth: Focused Parent-Child Tasks
The third technique we have used involves collecting data in more focused
settings where parents and children are asked to engage in an activity
where causal conversations are likely to take place. We will focus on one
study in particular. in which we constructed a book that asked "\Vhat hap
pened to the ...?"and showed various three-picture sequences of change
of-state evems such as a mushroom growing, the moon changing shape,
and a balloon dcOating (Jipson & Callanan, 1999). The majority of the
families in this study were from middle-income, Europea n-American
backgrounds. We expected parents and children to talk about causal
explanations for the cha nges pictured in the book.
In this focused task. we found parents using many of the sa me strate
gies as in the museum study. Parents explained specific causal mecha
nisms rat her than abstract scit!ntific principles. Parents often referred to
children's prior experience with similar ev.:nts. And. parents often seemed
to help children to identify the domain that is relevant to the events under
discussion.
In an example from Jipson and Callanan ( 1999), a parent was helping
her child explain changes of sta te, such as pictures of the moon in differ
ent phases:
Parent: Ytalt, it's n full moo11... Do you
ger?

Chi ld:

P3rem:
Child:
Part•n t:
Child:
Parent:
Child:

Parent:
Child:

Parenr:
Child:

P.mmt:

/Jecnust• it's growirtg.
It's growirtg? Does this gr~w like mushrooms grow? {refer.
m1g to a pteturc sec11 e~~rber i11 the book}
Uh, ye11h.
lr grows i11 rh.: dirt> I've never sce11 the moo11 in the dirt!
No.
No, the moon is up in the sky!
Yeah. Why did they grow up?
You know why it looks like it's growmg?
Uml1m.
:ou hnvc asked me about this before. The earth 15 blocking
11. It's a shadow so it gets bigger and b1gger and b1ggt'r.
\\/here's the shadow?
You cnt~'t see it...

Thts parent seemed somewhat surprised that her child appeared to think
the moon actually grm~s. In her c:onversation she seems to be trying to
find out whether her chtld really mtsunderstands. In doing so, this mother
contrasts the apparent growth of the moon with the more familiar event
of mushrooms growing. As this conversation unfolds. the parent not only
provides information _about the process of growth (as related to dirt), but
also offers an ahernattvc explanation of the phases of the moon as related
to the physical movement of astronomical objects. Despite the fact that
this. paren~ is technic~lly wrong about the reason for the moon's phases (a
toptc t~a t .'soften s~nously misunderstood by many adults), she does give
the ch tld tnformallon about the correct general domain for this event. J
Th_us, as _they negotiate meaning in a particular explanation, parents may
gut de chtldren toward the "correct" domain by suggesting domain-appro
pnatc form_s of explanation. Further, as suggested by the above example.
p_arents agam connected the current discussion to the child's earlier expe
rrem:cs tha t were relevant.
In another exttmp lc. Jipson and Callanan ( 1999) observed one mother
attempt to explain crystal formation by saying. "It's kind of a rock that
kmda grows. It doesn't really grow because it's not alive, but it grows

J Al tha.s pntnc sugg:nts. the w;ay the Moon looks 1n the sky b rtbtt"d to 1ts poiiuon m rd~tton to tht
E.lr>h •nd lh< Sun llowov<r, th• ph>><> ofth< moon.,... not eauS<d by lh• E.lrth's sh>dow ln<t<>d•
krtow why it's gettirtg big
.u the Moon movrs tn HJ orbu .around the Earth. our vu:w of the sJdt tHurmnJtN by the Sun
ch.oangC"S For eumpJc. whtn the Moon s.s b«wttn the E.lrth .1nd lht Sun~ we can't S« It bn;_,u~ the
hgh1 from lh< wn 1> h1111ng th< <ld< o( •h• ~loon •wav from th< E.lnh (N<W Moon).
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because it adds more and more of the.> rock to it." In this example, the
mother not only provides information about the ontology of crystals, bu t
a lso suggests something about the domain-~pecificity of the p ~ocess of
growth. Interactions of this kind may help ch1ld ren negouate the1r under
standings of objects and events in the world, and cons~~uently: can .be
considered to be a context for the construction and reVISIOn of mtu1t1ve
theories.
Parents' conversations with ch ildren about scientific topics may vary
in important ways depending on the activity setting in which the conver
sation takes place. This variability is very apparent in a comparison of the
discussions of growth we observed in the museum vs. in the focused
book- rcadmg task. While 32o/o of the parents at the museum exhibit used
at least one explanation, 98o/o of the book reading interactio~s involved at
least one explanation. The explanations in the book rcadmg task also
tended to be longer and more involved. There are obvious reasons why
parents focused more on explanations in the book-reading task, most
notably because the book activity was defined by the researchers and the
parents' goal was to participate in the research. In the .museum, althoug.h
they knew they were being videotaped, parents and children we.re. ~egoh
ating their own goals and structuring multiple simultaneous actJVJIIes. We
see both activity settings as valid representations of some conversations
that children eng.tge in with parents. The book- reading conversations
seem similar to some of the diary conversations. and may be representa
tive of reflective situations in which chi ldren and parents focus on a par
ticular topic for an extended time.
Of course, not all book-readi ng tasks are likely to elicit explanations,
as mentioned in the earlier discussion of the work of Gelman et al.,
( 1998). Our book clearly presented several phases in the change-of-s tate
of an object and explicitly asked parents and children to discuss that
change by asking "What happened to the ... ~" Gelman and her colleagues
used a picture book that depicted objects varying in similarity, and did
not provide text that would direct the conversation. Even within the genre
of book reading, then, different kinds of conversational activity settings
are encouraged depending on the content and goals of the book. In any
case, taken together. the findings emphasize the importance of muluple
methods in order to get a complete picture of the explanatory talk in
which children and parents engage.
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The Impact of Causal Conversations on C h ildren's T hinking
Overa ll, the studies described show that wh ile paren ts rarely articulate
complex scientific principles, they are providing other sorts of informa
tion that may well co n tribute to children's developing scientific literacy. In
all three types of studies, pa rents seem to be prov iding fragments of
explanatory information about particular events as children experience
them. These fragments could potentially be used by children to construct
causal theories. What remains open, however, is the more intractable
question of whether these conversations are in fact influenci11g children's
(and perhaps parents') understanding ofscientific phenomena.
There dre several difficulties to consider when attempting to address
this question. First, it is not obvious what one would predict in terms of
measurable impact of a par:icular explanatory conversation. We would
not necessarily expect that a simple pretest-posttest design would be an
appropriate test, given the complexity of human cognition. Instead, socio
cultural theory would lead us to think about children's science under
standing as emerging and being revised over many such interactions.
Second, it is difficult for correlational findings to be convincing evidence
of impact. We can look at individual differences in parents' styles ofexpla
nation and correlations with children's understanding of scientific topics.
Even then, however, the direction of effect cannot be disambiguated. Par
ents who explain often may influence children's understanding, orchil
dren who understand scientific concepts may encourage their parents to
explain. One possible solu tion to these problems is to investigate parent
child conversations on a particular topic over a period of time in a micro
genetic approach, looking at more detailed and specific connections
between parents' explanations and children's understanding.
One might ask how likely it is tha t the kinds of strategies we have
uncovered will be found to have an impact o n children's science under
standing. As we have said, these are often "fragments" rather than full
fledged scientific explanations. Recent studies of scientific thinking, how
ever, remind us that adults, and even adult scientists, do not think in
terms of flawless scien tific theories (Kuhn, 1996; Dunbar, 1997; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1990). These explanatory fragments could, in fact, be more
helpful to children than more complete causal explanations. As men 
tioned earlier, Gelman, et al. ( 1998) report in their monograph that par
ents rarely discussed the nonobvious features that differentiate different
types of ObJects (such as animals vs. machines). In his commentary on
that same monograph. Keil ( 1998) argues that the indirect ways that par
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in the Gelman et a!. study discuss categories of objects may be much
more appropriate to their children's level of understanding. Keil discu~ses
the problem of"explanatory sa tiation," and argues that:
Rather than try to load the child down with what would ultimately be an
impossible burden or detail, the parent is instead showing the child how
to approach various domains and allowing the child to proceed to dis·
cover the detail~ at her own pace. (Keil, t 998. p. I 52)

It remains to be seen what level of det:til is most appropriate in explana
tory conversations with children. Our findings seem to be parallel to those
of Gelman and her collc:tgues, though, in th.tt parents are providing sys·
terna tic yet incomplete information about complex li nks :tmong objects
and even ts experienced by children.
Aside from the issue of the relative completeness of pa rents' explana
tions to children is the issue that parents sometimes even provide children
with information th.ll is incorrect or misleading. More rese,nch is needed
to assess the potent tally negative, as well as postttve, effects ofexplanatory
conversations. If our focus is on children's scientific literacy, rather than
their knowledge of pa rticula r causal mechanisms, however, then the accu
racy of particular comments may be less importa nt than a discou rse style
th at helps children figure out how to ask and lind answers to questions.
~vt.'n incorrect explanations may help children to explore their own ideas
about a topic and to further their understanding in the long run.

Design ing for Science
What can be learned from this resea rch regarding the design of science
educatio n? Despite the open questions th at re mai n, these findings are
poten tially relevan t to early childhood educa tors. parents of young chil
dren, and designers of informal science education programs (e.g.. muse
ums).
There is a great deal of agreement among early childhood educators
that academic skill-based instruction is not developmentally appropriate
for young children (Elkind, 1986; Hirsh-Pasek. Hyson, & Rescorla, 1990}.
Instead, many ~ducators prefer "developmentally appropriate practice"
for preschool-aged children, which is defined by the Nat ional Associat ion
for the Educa tion of Young Children (Bredckamp. 1987; Hart. Burts, &
Charlesworth, 1997} as child-centered, exploratory, and contextualized.
Our data support this approach to early education. In our studies, chil·
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1 •s questions reveal their natural curiosity about the world (see also
1 IS, 1995). Developmentally appropria te science instruction capital
tz ·s on young children's na tu ra l curiosi ty; rather than focusing on the
·rwht" answers. teachers engage children in the process of doing science.
1 restingly. many of the authors of other chapters in this volume discuss
els of science education that have much in common with this pre
ool model. While, traditionally, classroom science activities often con·
a sense of science as objechvc and authoritative (Lemke, 1990), recent
,. rk on innovative science instruction shows that even adolescents' sci·
1ce learning should perhaps be more focused on students' spontaneous
que• tions and process of discovery (e.g.• Warren & Roscbery, 1996). Per
haps thl' des ign of science educa tion prog rams, even for olde r children.
,hould find better ways to make links with children's curiosity as a sta rting
oint for encouraging engagement with science topics.
Our findings speak to parents as well as teachers. suggesting that they
~ n support children's science learning without intentionally focusing on
;rtstructton. Just by attending to children's spontaneous questions. and by
commenttng on their actions, parents may be making powerful contribu·
ions to their child's emerging scientific literacy. Consistent with Gelman
et a!. ( 1998), we do not very often see pare nts giving co mplex scientific
explanations. But, consistent wit h the guideli nes of developmen tally
appropriate practice and with Keil's ( 1998) arguments mentioned above,
we would agree that school-like tutoring is not the best way to support
young children's engagement in scientific thinking. Across groups of par
ents with very different educational and cultural background~. we have
generally seen a tendency for parents to respond to their chtldren's curios
ity in ways that are suggested by child development experts. In particular,
they con tcxtualize new concepts and experiences by rela ting them to
fa miliar topics, and they follow their children's lead by taking their qucs·
l ions as an invitation to reflect on and discuss complex phenomena.
Finally, our data may aho have some relevance for the design of infor
mal science education programs. In the field of museum learning, con
structivist theory has been very influential over the p.tst several decades,
leading to many hands-on interactive exhibits and to a philosophy that
children are best left to explore exhtbits on their own terms. Our findings
support a slightly different approach to museum design, which is gaining
popularity, and wh ich is based on sociocult ural Lhcories such as
Vygotsky's ( 1978; see also Schauble. Lei nha rdt, & Martin, 1998). In our
work, parents' conversations with children about scientific topics seem to
structure and guide children's interactions with exhibits in fruitful ways,
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suggesting that exhibits should be designed t<) increase. th~ potential for
interaction. As Crowley and Callanan ( 1998) argued, destgnmg exhtbtts so
that they fow~r parent-child interaction may increase the potential learn
ing experiences for children in exhibits. Supporting parent-child. involve
ment can be achieved in many ways. Even such munda ne tssues as
whether there is a place for parents to sit near the exhibit can have impact
on the likelihood th<lt meaningful interactions will take place. Prcctse
decisions about how to improve the quality of interactions await further
research and debate. r:or example, many complex decisions go into the
design of signs to accompany exhibits. Parents may need t.o know some
thing about how an exhibit works before they are able to gtve clear expla
nations to children. Signs that are too didactic, however, may lead to
stilted conversations. Solutions to such problems will vary depending on
the philosophy of the design team and the goals of the particuJar exhibit.
Conclusioru,
Across several different projects. we are beginning to formuJate a model of
how explanatory conversations may impact children's learning. Parents
dre not often guiding children directly toward reflective, abstract under
standings of science. However, by focusing on particular events of interest
in the moment, they may be giving children fragments of mformallon
that allow them to build up coherent understanding of particular events.
What is strikingly similar across the conversations we have studied is that
parents' explanations arc likely to be focused on the particular event on
which children arc focused. Rather than trying to teach children an
abstract principle, parents are likely to be providing a narrative of a partic
ular experience. In line wi th Kc il's (1998) argument about explanatory
satiation. wt: would argue that this focus on specificity may be the appro
priate level of focus for preschool children. The child may be able to grad
ually accumulate these understandings to develop a broader understand
ing of a phenomenon.
ln addition to g•Jiding children's understanding of specific causal
mechanisms, parents are also modeling for children various aspects of the
process ofdiscovery in science: showing them how to formulate questions,
find answers. and test predictions. Further, parents' explanations demon
strate for children that there is value in knowing about causes for events.
Exploring these conversallons is relevant to research and theory in
several different areas in cognitive development and education. The "the
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JrY theory" approach in cognitive development focuses on children as lit
tle scientists, developing and revising theories of the world around them
(Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Well man & Gel man, 1998). Studying children's
conversations about science might help us to understand how children
encounter evide nce that leads them to change their theories ove r time.
These conversations are also relevant to research in scientific reasoning.
Although much of the research on science reasoning focuses on older chil
dren (e.g .• Schauble. 1996), studying preschool children's thinking can tell
us about the early development ofsuch skills as hypothesis-testing and usc
of evidence. A third relevant research area is recent work on science edu
cation. As mentioned earlier, recent work in science instruction empha
sizes the importance of social construction of scientific knowledge.
Warren and Rosebery's ( 1996) work with Haitian immigrant students, for
example, focuses on argumentation in the activity of doing science and
shows that children's science learning can be more effective when taught
in the context of collaboration (see also Brown, 1997; Greeno, 1998). By
exploring the social contexts within which preschool children engage sci
entific ideas. we may be able to learn more about ways that this process of
discovery can be extended and encouraged. Investigating whether and
how these conversations vary across cultures will be very important in
future research.
The results of our studies cannot, in themselves, tell us whether chil
dren learn new theories through conversation. A description of parents'
explanations to children. however, is a starting place from which we can
begin to consider the possibility tha t theory development is not purely :tn
in ternal matter. There are hints in these data about the possible ways that
the social context and the cultural background of families create difft!rent
environments withi n which chi ldren are learning about theory-relevant
phenomena. The challenging nex t step is to find ways to assess the impor
tance of these conversations for children's developing scientific literacy.
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